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Background: The novel swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus (S-O 2009 IV) can cause respiratory infectious diseases
in humans and pigs, but there are few studies investigating the airborne spread of the virus. In January 2011, a
swine-origin H1N1 epidemic emerged in eastern China that rapidly spread to neighboring farms, likely by aerosols
carried by the wind.
Methods: In this study, quantitative reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) was used to detect
viruses in air samples from pig farms. Based on two aerosol infection models (Pig and guinea pig), we evaluated
aerosol transmission and infection of the novel S-O 2009 IV isolate.
Results: Three novel S-O 2009 IV were isolated from the diseased pig. The positive rate and viral loads of air
samples were 26.1% and 3.14-5.72 log10copies/m
3 air, respectively. In both pig and guinea pig infection models, the
isolate (A/swine/Shandong/07/2011) was capable of forming aerosols and infected experimental animals at a range
of 2.0-4.2 m by aerosols, but aerosol route was less efficient than direct contact.
Conclusions: The results indicated that S-O 2009 IV is able to be aerosolized by infected animals and to be
transmitted to susceptible animals by airborne routes.
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In April 2009, swine-origin 2009 A (H1N1) influenza vi-
ruses (S-O 2009 IV) were found in Mexico and the
United States for the first time, and quickly spread
throughout the world, presenting a significant threat to
public health [1,2]. S-O 2009 IV is a novel triple-
reassortant influenza virus derived from porcine, human,
and avian influenza viruses. Different from seasonal in-
fluenza viruses, humans lack immunity to this new virus,
and thus the virus quickly caused a pandemic [2-5]. As
of March 21, 2010, the World Health Organization
(WHO) reported that 213 countries or regions were af-
fected and the number of deaths was at least 16,931
people [6].* Correspondence: zengminmiao@126.com; chaitj117@163.com
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orIt has been determined that despite the complex
causes of the novel S-O 2009 IV epidemic, airborne
spread was one of the major reasons for the pandemic
[7]. Aerosols are solid or liquid suspensions in the air
and their particle size range is 0.001-100 μm [8]. Once
formed, aerosols, including those containing viruses, can
rapidly spread to a larger area with the assistance of the
wind [9]. However, little is known about the transmis-
sion and infection of the novel S-O 2009 IV via aerosols,
and there is still some debate about airborne infection of
this virus [7,8,10,11].
In early January 2011, a local animal disease preven-
tion and control center in Shandong, China reported
that a pig farm in eastern China emerged the suspected
novel S-O 2009 IV disease. More importantly, similar in-
fections occurred successively in some downwind pig
farms within a week, and workers of these pig farms de-
veloped flu-like symptoms. Isolation and identification
of pathogens confirmed S-O 2009 IV infection. Thus, weLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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ant role in the spread of this epidemic. Here, we col-
lected indoor air, pig nasopharyngeal swabs, and blood
samples to analyze the positive rate of the S-O 2009 IV;
and based on both pig and guinea pig aerosol infection




The seven viral isolates were obtained from the nasopha-
ryngeal swab samples, including three strains of H1N1
and four strains of H3N2. Antigenicity and sequence
analysis of the three strains of H1N1 viruses confirmed
that the isolated strain was S-O 2009 IV. And the isolate
(A/swine/Shandong/07/2011) was used in aerosol infec-
tion models to verify its airborne transmission traits.
Results of air and serum samples
The positive rate of 157 air samples collected from the
40 pig farms was 26.1% (41/157) and the virus content
range was 4.09-5.72 log10copies/m
3 air; hemagglutina-
tion and hemagglutination-inhibition (HA-HI) tests
showed that the positive rate of serum samples was
28.5% (57/200) and titers were 80–2560. Infection ana-
lysis of staff with flu-like symptoms from seven pigTable 1 Detection results of airborne S-O 2009 IV in 40 pig fa




Farm 1 4/6 4. 14–5.62 3/5 Fa
Farm 2 4/6 4.05-4.93 5/5 Fa
Farm 3 2/5 3.83/5.66 4/5 Fa
Farm 4 2/4 4.20/4.54 3/5 Fa
Farm 5 2/4 4.75/5. 19 2/5 Fa
Farm 6 2/4 3.74/4.64 4/5 Fa
Farm 7 3/4 4.20-4.63 3/5 Fa
Farm 8 3/4 4.12-5.72 4/5 Fa
Farm 9 3/4 4.55-5. 09 3/5 Fa
Farm10 0/4 0 1/5 Fa
Farm 11 0/3 0 0/5 Fa
Farm12 0/3 0 0/5 Fa
Farm13 0/4 0 0/5 Fa
Farm14 0/4 0 0/5 Fa
Farm15 1/3 5.50 0/5 Fa
Farm16 0/4 0 0/5 Fa
Farm17 2/4 4.42/5.02 1/5 Fa
Farm18 1/5 5.59 1/5 Fa
Farm19 3/4 4. 91–5.33 4/5 Fa
Farm20 0/4 0 0/5 Fafarms found that 43.5% (10/23) were seropositive rate
for S-O 2009 IV infection (from CDC) (Table 1).
Results of S-O 2009 IV aerosol infection models
All experimental pigs and guinea pigs in the challenged
groups were shown to shed viruses and seroconverted to
S-O 2009 IV. In the swine infection model experiments,
viruses were detected in the direct contact groups from
nasal secretions of three pigs during the first round of ex-
periment and two pigs during the second round. In the
aerosol infection group, two pigs were positive during the
first round of experiments and one positive during
the second round. Pigs with virus detected in nasal secre-
tions were also positive by serological testing. Serum titers
of the direct contact group and aerosol infection group
were 320–1280 and 640–1280, respectively (Table 2).
In the guinea pig infection model experiments, viruses
were detected in nasal secretions from four guinea pigs
in the first round of experiments and three guinea pigs
in the second round in the direct contact group. In the
aerosol infection group, viruses were detected in nasal
secretions from two guinea pigs for the first round of ex-
periments and three guinea pigs for the second round.
Serum titers of animals in the direct contact group and
aerosol infection group were 320–1280 and 320–1280,
respectively (Table 2).rms
rms Air samples Virus RNA copies
of air samples (log10/m
3)
Sero- Conversion
rm 21 3/6 4.41-5.07 3/5
rm 22 0/4 0 0/5
rm 23 1/4 4.62 2/5
rm 24 1/4 4.40 2/5
rm 25 1/3 4.78 1/5
rm 26 1/4 3.14 2/5
rm 27 0/4 0 0/5
rm 28 0/3 0 0/5
rm 29 0/3 0 0/5
rm 30 0/3 0 1/5
rm 31 0/3 0 0/5
rm 32 0/3 0 0/5
rm33 1/4 4.95 3/5
rm34 0/4 0 0/5
rm35 0/3 0 1/5
rm 36 0/4 0 0/5
rm 37 0/3 0 0/5
rm 38 1/4 4.65 3/5
rm 39 0/4 0 0/5
rm 40 0/4 0 1/5
Table 2 Transmission and infection of 2009 A(H1N1) IV aerosol in pig model and guinea pig model
Inoculated animals DC animals§ AI animals§
Virus in nasal wash#
(log10peak copies/ml)
Sero- conversion* Virus in nasal wash#
(log10peak copies/ml)
Sero- conversion* Virus in nasal wash#
(log10peak copies/ml)
Sero- conversion*
Pigs 1 3/3(5.3-6.1) 3/3(640–2560) 3/3(4.9-5.6) 3/3(320–1280) 2/3(5.5-6.0) 2/3(640–1280)
2 3/3(5.1-5.8) 3/3(640–1280) 2/3(5.1-5.6) 2/3(320–640) 1/3(4.9) 1/3(640)
Guinea Pigs 1 5/5(4.3-5.2) 5/5(640–1280) 4/5(4.2-4.8) 4/5(640–1280) 2/5(3.8-5.1) 2/5(320–640)
2 5/5(5.4-6.2) 5/5(320–1280) 3/5(4.7-5.8) 3/5(320–1280) 3/5(4.1-6.2) 3/5(320–1280)
§DC direct contact; AI aerosol infection; #Virus titers are expressed as mean log10peak copies/ml;
*Hemagglutination inhibition(HI)assay was performed with
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Figure 1 Concentration of the SO 2009(H1N1)IV aerosol produced by pigs and guinea pigs in isolators A and B. The diamond represents
the first round of experiment; triangle represents the second. Black represents isolator A, white represents isolator B. (B) Not detected in the first
round of experiment 4dpi Day 0: animals in group A w ere intranasally inoculated with 106 pfu of the novel influenza A (H1N1) virus.
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Figure 2 Distribution characteristics of the novel influenza A
(H1N1) virus from isolator A and B on the Andersen-8-stage
impactor, Based on RT-qPCR results. X-axis: aerodynamic
diameter of airborne viral particles on Andersen-8 sampler (from left
to right:1-8 stage); Y-axis: the distribution percentage of viral
particles on every stage of Andersen-8 sampler.
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periments, S-O 2009 IV aerosols were detected at the
beginning of 1 day post-infection (dpi) in isolator A,
peaked (4.87, 4.40 log10copies/m
3 air) at 5 and 4 dpi,
and was absent from 12 or 13 dpi. In isolator B, S-O
2009 IV aerosols were detected at 2 dpi, peaked (3.62,
3.27 log10copies/m
3 air) at 5 and 4 dpi, and was absent
after 10 or 11 dpi (Figure 1A).
For the guinea pig experimental infection model, the
results of the two rounds of experiments indicated that
virus shedding was detected at 1 dpi of the challenged
group; S-O 2009 IV aerosols were detected at 1 and 2
dpi, peaked at 4 and 5 dpi (in isolator A and in isolator
B) and disappeared at 11–13 dpi. In the two rounds of
guinea pig infection model experiments, S-O 2009 IV
aerosols were detected at 1 dpi in isolator A, peaked at 4
and 5 dpi (3.93, 3.80 log10copies/m
3 air), and was absent
from 12–13 dpi. In isolator B, SO 2009 IV aerosols were
detected at post-inoculation 2 and 3 days, peaked at 5
dpi (3.47, 3.49 log10copies/m
3 air), and was absent at 11
or 12 dpi (Figure 1B).Diameter of S-O 2009 IV aerosol particles
In isolator A, the distribution ratio of viral aerosol par-
ticle sizes was highest for a particle diameter of 3.3-4.7
μm (40.95%), and lowest for 0.65-1.1 μm (0.30%). In iso-
lator B, the distribution ratio of viral aerosol particle
sizes was highest for particle diameters of 1.1-2.1 μm
(41.45%), and lowest for 5.8-9.0 μm (2.28%) (Figure 2).Discussion
Since early January 2011, the S-O 2009 IV epidemic was
first identified in two pig farms of eastern China that
quickly spread to nearly 20 farms within a week. A geo-
graphical analysis of these pig farms showed that these
farms were distributed in a close ellipsoid zone with a cen-
tral axis in line with prevailing northwesterly winds. A col-
lection of 157 air samples from 40 pig farms revealed that
26.1% contained virus with almost 50% of pig farms in the
area affected. This transmission was presumed to be via
downwind dissemination of S-O 2009 IV aerosols. It ap-
pears that the virus was spread by airborne transmission
and our findings in experimental models support this.
During the experiments, pigs and guinea pigs were
housed in positive- and negative-pressure isolators, effect-
ively avoiding the contamination with exogenous mi-
crobes. Aerosol transmission experiments were conducted
so that the air in isolator B came exclusively from isolator
A, which were connected using a 2 m closed tube. There-
fore, any infection in isolator B would be determined as
aerosols (Figure 3).
During the experimental infections in pigs, S-O 2009
IV was detected at 1–2 dpi in isolators A and B, and the
maximum amount of virus detected in A and B were
and 4.40-4.87 log10copies/m3 air and 3.27-3.62
log10copies/m3 air, at 4 and 5 dpi, respectively. How-
ever, during the two rounds of experiments, the amounts
of virus detected were consistently lower in B than in A
and virus was not detectable at 12–13 dpi in A and at
10–11 dpi in B. The duration of detectable S-O 2009 IV
aerosols in isolator B was shorter and the amounts of
virus were lower than those in isolator A, which was
likely related with the deposition, survival time, and re-
moval of aerosol particles.
There is a 2m pipe between the two isolators (upper
distal end, 5.3m from the challenged group; Figure 4);
therefore, infection in isolator B occurred not via droplet
but by aerosolized virus particles. Meanwhile the certain
wind velocity in the pipe can well simulate natural wind
between different pig farms, even between different pig
houses in the same farm. Additionally, aerosol infection
group and direct contact group were both serologically
positive and nasal secretions had evidence of virus shed-
ding. Nonetheless, the number of infections in aerosol
infection group was smaller than in direct contact group,
there was no difference in the extent of virus shedding
and serum titers of infected pigs. These data demon-
strated that infection with these viral strains can induce
airborne infection.
Our data indicated that infected pigs located in up-
wind farms can generate viruses in nasal and respiratory
secretions and spread via the wind to downwind farms.
Thus, this type of transmission is dependent on weather,
where changes in wind force, wind direction, ultraviolet
Figure 3 The map is the part of East China area, red points represent the positive pig farms, and yellow ones represent the negative pig farms.
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transmission.
Since the respiratory tract of guinea pigs is very similar
to that of humans, guinea pigs were regarded as an appro-
priate mammalian model for use in this study [12]. In the
two repeated trials on guinea pigs, the rates of virus detec-
tion and seroconversion to the S-O 2009 IV in aerosol in-
fection group were 2/5 and 3/5 (Table 2), indicating that
aerosol infection group was infected by viral aerosols in
isolator A and the virus had the capability of airborne
transmission among mammals. Therefore, it can be in-
ferred that S-O 2009 IV is likely to be a health risk for
farm staff and may be an important point for the preven-
tion and control of new zoonoses, especially swine influ-
enza viruses. It has been reported that the S-O 2009 IV is
still persistent among pigs in China and thus remains a
major threat to human health [13,14].
At 4 and 5 dpi, the virus content in air samples
reached its peak in the isolator along with the amount of
virus in nasal secretions and the number of pigs infected
in different groups. These data indicated that the
amount of virus contained in aerosols is related to the
virus shedding capacity and number of infected animals.
Until 11–13 dpi, no airborne S-O 2009 IV was detected
in the two isolators. Correspondingly, animals in all the
experimental groups no longer shed virus. These results
suggest that the viruses produced in nasal secretions by
animals formed aerosols.
Although the detectable time and concentrations of
airborne virus in the two animal experiments were dif-
ferent, the viral aerosol concentration increased or de-
creased coincidentally. In addition, the viral aerosol
concentration was affected by the ventilation rate and
the number of infected animals.The aerodynamic diameter ranges of aerosols in isola-
tor A were determined to be 3.3-4.7 μm and 5.8-9.0 μm;
however, in isolator B particle size was typically 1.1-2.1
μm. The loss of large particle droplets was mainly due to
sedimentation, and the loss of aerosol particles <5μm
was mainly due to the inactivation of virus particles and
ventilation [15], indicating that smaller particles gath-
ered in isolator B under the effect of ventilation. In the
two isolators, particles were typically ≤ 4.7 μm, showing
that a higher proportion of viral aerosols can enter the
lower respiratory tract via the nasal cavity, whereas par-
ticles ≤1 μm can enter bronchioles and alveoli, and de-
posit in the alveoli, increasing the risk of serious
infection. Gustin et al. [16] indicated that when
discharged by breathing or sneezing in ferrets, influenza
virus particles were typically ≤4.7 μm. During the flu
season, the less than 4 μm (aerodynamic diameter) influ-
enza viral aerosol particles accounted for 53% of the air-
borne influenza viral count in hospital environments
[17-19], consistent with the experimental results of this
study. In conclusion, animals infected with S-O 2009
IV can form aerosols that can lead to airborne
transmission.
Materials and methods
Outbreak of the epidemic and virus isolation and
identification
The swine flu epidemic occurred in eastern China (119° E,
36.30° N), a warm temperate semi-humid monsoon
climate zone, with cold, dry winters dominated by north-
westerly winds [20]. In early January 2011, a suspected
new swine flu epidemic suddenly emerged in a few pig
farms of this region and within a week similar epidemics
emerged successively in some pig farms in the downwind
Figure 4 Arrangement of the isolators applicable to pigs and guinea pigs. Animals in inoculation group (GA) and direct contact group (GB)
were housed in the isolator A, and animals in aerosol infection group (GC) were housed in the isolator B. The two isolators were connected with
a tube(2 m) which allowed the air flowed from A to B. SH is a sampling hole from which air samples were collected. F1 is a positive pressure fan
and F2 is a negative fan. The air flowing through the two fans was filtered to remove microorganisms.
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pharyngeal swabs taken from infected pigs were collected
for virus isolation and identification, as previously de-
scribed by Cong et al. [21]. Samples were processed in a
BSL −2+ laboratory.
Collection and process of air, nasopharyngeal swab and
blood samples
A total of 157 air samples were collected using AGI-30
(All Glass Impinger) placed in the middle of the pig
farm, at 1.5 m from the ground, using 20 mL phosphate
buffered saline (PBS) sampling medium, with a flow vel-
ocity of 12.5 L/min for 40 min [22,23]. Virus was
detected in samples using the RT-qPCR methods [24].
Serum samples from pigs (n=200) and pig farm staff
(n=23) displaying flu-like symptoms were collected and
processed by the local centers for disease control
(CDC) [25].
Establishment of S-O 2009 IV aerosols transmission
and infection models
Weaned piglets (8–10 kg) and guinea pigs (250–300 g)
seronegative for S-O 2009 IV were purchased from the
Shandong Taibang Biological Product Co., Ltd. And used
for experimental infections. All prevailing local, national
and international regulations and conventions, and nor-
mal scientific ethical practices have been respected in
this study. Two positive- and negative-pressure isolators
A and B (Model C.C.JH-1; Tianjin Jinhang Purified Air
Conditioning Engineering Company, China) were
connected using a closed tube 2 m in length and 8 cm
in diameter, to adjust air flow from A to B, which not
only prevented direct contact of animals in the aerosol
infection group with those in the inoculation group, but
also prevented the propagation of droplets (Figure 4).
Three pigs or five guinea pigs were intranasallyinoculated with 106 plaque-forming units (PFU) of vi-
ruses were placed in isolator A, and were designated in-
oculation group. After 24 h, another three pigs or five
guinea pigs were placed into isolator A, and were desig-
nated direct contact group. Three pigs or five guinea
pigs were placed into isolator B, and were designated
aerosol infection group [26,27]. The isolator temperature
was maintained at 20±1 °C, 30±4 % relative humidity
(RH), and 0.05-0.2 m/s wind velocity [28]. Pig and
guinea pig experiments were conducted independently
and repeated. “The Society for Animal Health Feedings
& Animal Welfare of Shandong Province approved the
study of “Airbone spread and infection of a novel swine-
origin influenza A(H1N1) virus” and agreed to exam the
serum samples from 200 pigs and 23 pig farm staff for
the experiments of that.
Collection of aerosols, nasal washes, and blood
in infection experiments
After sequencing and analysis of eight fragments from
several virulent strains, three strains were identified as
the S-O 2009 IV and one of them was used for the aero-
sol dissemination experiment. Virus shedding and serum
antibodies of nasal secretions in experimental animals
were monitored and detected to verify if the experimen-
tal animals were infected. Nasal secretions from each
animal were collected every other day after virus inocu-
lation and after RNA extraction, virus nucleic acids were
detected by RT-qPCR [29]. At 7 and 14 dpi, blood from
each experiment animal was collected to test for specific
antibodies [30].
After inoculation, the AGI-30 air collection device was
used to collect air samples in isolators A and B on each
day [26] and the virus content in samples was detected
using RT-qPCR. To determine the proportion and distri-
bution of aerosol particles of different sizes, at 4 dpi of
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the Andersen-8-level collector [18] was used to collect
aerosolized viral particles in isolators A and B, using a
sterile1% gelatin glycerol (1% gelatin PBS and glycerol
1:1 mixed) as the medium, at 28.3 L/min flow velocity
for 40 min, and the virus content of every level was
detected by RT-qPCR.
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